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OUR UNCONSTITUTIONAL SENATE 
Suzanna Sherry* 
In the race to the bottom that characterizes this Symposium, 
I cast my vote for Article I, section 3: "The Senate of the United 
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State .... " 
Indeed, were this provision not unequivocally enshrined in the 
Constitution itself, it would undoubtedly be unconstitutional, for, 
as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, it is in con-
flict with the most basic principles of democracy underlying our 
Constitution and the form of government it establishes. 
The Court has held that "[l]egislators represent people, not 
trees or acres,"1 and that "[t]he conception of political equality 
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg 
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote."2 To hold 
otherwise would be to allow a vote to be "worth more in one 
district than in another" and would thus "run counter to our fun-
damental ideas of democratic government."3 The Court has ac-
cordingly invalidated legislative districting schemes where the 
disparity in population between the largest and smallest districts 
entitled to the same number of legislators is as little as 1.07 to 1.4 
How, then, can a democratic nation tolerate a Senate in which 
the largest state has more than 65 times the population of the 
smallest and yet each has two Senators? Moreover, the Court has 
waxed eloquent on the inequity of "minority control of ... legis-
lative bodies" in "a society ostensibly grounded on representa-
tive government."s What, then, should we conclude about a 
Senate in which slightly over 17% of the population elects a ma-
jority of the members? 
• Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of 
Minnesota. 
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
2. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
4. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 125 (1983) (invalidating Congressional districts 
where maximum deviation was 0.7%); but see Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) 
(upholding state legislative districts where maximum deviation was 89% ). 
5. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
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To answer that the provision, while indefensible, is harmless 
because laws require the concurrence of the House of Represent-
atives as well, is to forget that the Senate has unique powers. On 
October 15, 1991, the Senate voted to confirm Clarence Thomas 
to the Supreme Court, by a vote of 52 to 48.6 But the vote in the 
Senate conceals an exactly opposite split in the population at 
large. The delegations from twenty-two states split their votes, 
with one Senator voting in favor and one against. Fifteen states 
voted entirely in favor and thirteen entirely against. Tallying the 
populations of each state (and allocating half the population of 
the split-vote states to each side) yields the conclusion that the 
Senators voting in favor of Judge Thomas represented 48% of 
the population and the Senators voting against him represented 
52% of the population.? A single change in vote by Senator 
D'Amato from New York would have increased the margin to 
56% against, without changing the result; a single change in vote 
by Senator Seymour of California would have increased the mar-
gin to 58% against, again without changing the result. (If both 
men had switched their votes, the percentage against would have 
increased to 62%, and presumably Vice President Quayle would 
have cast the deciding vote in favor.) Justice Thomas still sits on 
the United States Supreme Court despite the fact that the repre-
sentatives of a majority of the population voted against him.s 
The other standard defense of this otherwise unjustifiable 
provision is as a necessary compromise between the large and 
small states: without it, we are told, the Constitution might never 
have been successfully written and ratified. While this may or 
may not be true, the circumstances of the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention reinforced the beliefs of the small states that they 
were entitled to equal representation, and made the ultimate 
compromise a foregone conclusion. Even before the Convention 
began, the state delegations agreed that each state would have a 
single vote during the proceedings, regardless of its population. 
Moreover, when ev.en that nile did not preclude a deadlock over 
whether to allocate representation by state or by population, the 
Convention sent the matter to a Committee of Eleven which con-
sisted of one delegate from each of the states present at the Con-
6. 137 Cong. Rec. S 14704-05 (October 15, 1991). 
7. All calculations are based on the population according to the 1990 census, as 
recorded in The World Almanac and Book of Facts: 1995 at 376-n. 
8. This is not an isolated example. A minority of the population similarly prevailed 
in 1986, when Daniel Manion was confirmed to sit on the Seventh Circuit by a closely 
divided vote. A thorough historical search would undoubtedly tum up many other such 
incidents. 
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vention. More ominous still, the Committee consisted of many 
of the most able and vocal delegates from the small states and 
none of the most uncompromising firebrands from the large 
states.9 The compromise-or concession, depending on one's 
point of view-was inevitable. We can only speculate on the re-
sults had the larger states been more insistent from the 
beginning. 
Why did the large states agree to such a crippling and ridicu-
lous situation? Because, at bottom, they trusted each other and 
the likely Senators from each state to represent the interests of 
the nation rather than of the individual states. The aristocratic 
Senate was never meant to be particularly representative of the 
population at large. As the nation became more and more dem-
ocratic, however, the Senate became an ever more glaring anom-
aly. The Seventeenth Amendment repaired a small part of the 
problem, but the more egregious malapportionment remains. 
9. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Conslilulion 
128-29 (West Pub. Co., 1990). 
